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APPELLATE REMEDY: THE ANCIENT PRECEDENTS
OF A MODERN RIGHT
Peter S. Poland*
Recourse to appeal, in both civil and criminal matters, is a
fixture of our modern state and federal legal systems.1 While the
American right of appeal does not rise to the level of a
constitutional right, it is not a doctrinal abstraction. Rather, it is
statutorily established,2 and referenced explicitly in the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure.3 As most appellate judges are
aware, litigants began exercising this right in increasing
numbers in what could be termed an appellate explosion ignited
in the early 1960s that lasted for decades.4 Because of the
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University, specializes in appeals and commercial litigation at The Ward Law Firm in The
Woodlands, Texas. Prior to entering private practice, he was a staff attorney at the First
Court of Appeals in Houston, Texas. Mr. Poland can be reached at poland@wardlaw.com.
1. See, e.g., Harlon Leigh Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less)
Seriously, 95 YALE L.J. 62, 62 (1985) (characterizing right to at least one appeal as “nearly
universal” in the United States).
2. An early reference to a right approaching the modern appeal appeared in the Evarts
Act, 26 Stat. 826 (1891), which established the Circuit Courts of Appeals. Id. at § 4
(providing that “all appeals by writ of error otherwise, from said district courts shall only
be subject to review in the Supreme Court of the United States or in the circuit court of
appeals hereby established”); see also Dalton, supra note 1, at 62 n.4 (citing McKane v.
Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894), for the proposition that right to appeal is “statutory, . . .
not constitutionally compelled”).
3. FED. R. APP. P. 3 (“Appeal as of Right—How Taken”); FED. R. APP. P. 4 (“Appeal
as of Right—When Taken”).
4. E.g., Ben F. Overton, A Prescription for the Appellate Caseload Explosion, 12 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 205, 205 (1984). But at least some courts began to experience a decrease in
filings after the turn of the twenty-first century. See, e.g., Federal Judicial Caseload
Statistics 2015, U.S. CTS. (2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federaljudicial-caseload-statistics-2015 (noting that in the year ended March 31, 2015, “filings
declined 2.5 percent” in the federal courts of appeals); Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics
2014, U.S. CTS. (2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseloadstatistics-2014 (noting that in the year ended March 31, 2014, “filings . . . fell 1.5 percent”
in the federal courts of appeals); Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2013, U.S. CTS.
(2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2013
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proliferation of appeals in the recent past, some perceive the
appeal5 as a modern creation. But tradition holds, albeit vaguely,
that the antecedents of our modern American appellate system
lie in the ancient world.6 This essay begins with short summaries
of ancient Near Eastern and Mediterranean legal procedures that
constitute or resemble appellate systems, and then briefly
explores which of their components endure in modern American
appellate procedure.

I. ANCIENT APPELLATE PRECEDENT
A. Mesopotamia
The most reliable evidence with which to reconstruct
ancient Mesopotamian legal procedure dates to around the turn
of the Second Millennium, B.C.E., when Sumer enjoyed a final
resurgence before its rapid decline. Courts of this era rendered
their final judgments on clay tablets of “no complaining,” and
evidence suggests that unsuccessful plaintiffs were required to
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(noting that in the year ended March 31, 2013, filings in the federal courts of appeals fell
by “less than 1 percent”); see also Judicial Caseload Indicators, U.S. CTS. (2013), http:/
/www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/judicial-caseload-indicators-federal-judicial-caseloadstatistics-2013 (noting that filings in the federal courts of appeals declined by 6.7 percent
between 2004 and 2012); cf., e.g., Thomas E. Baker, Applied Freakonomics: Explaining
the “Crisis of Volume,” 8 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 101, 102, 113–14 (2006) (pointing out
that despite the “doomsday clamor” prevalent from the 1960s through the 1990s, “the
courts of appeals [were] not hopelessly backlogged” in 2005, and were by then
“manag[ing] to decide about as many appeals as [were] filed each year”).
5. “Appeal” as used throughout this essay refers to the modern definition of the term:
“[a] proceeding undertaken to have a decision reconsidered by a higher authority;
esp[ecially], the submission of a lower court’s or agency’s decision to a higher court for
review and possible reversal.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 117 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 10th
ed. 2014). This article does not address other definitions of appeal peculiar to past eras and
unrelated to the modern term, such as the “appeal of felony” introduced to England after
the Norman Conquest, which consisted of the victim’s oral accusation of serious crime.
J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 573 (3d ed. 1990)
(indicating that this “appeal” might also be made by “approvers”—accomplices of the
accused who could avoid punishment if they agreed to prosecute their fellows); HAROLD J.
BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION 450 (1983) (explaining that “appeal” as used in
medieval England “had no such connotations as it has today”).
6. See, e.g., FRANK M. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE: REFLECTIONS FROM THE
FEDERAL APPELLATE BENCH 17 (1980) (observing that our modern appellate system can
be traced, at least in part, to the ancient Near East).
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swear oaths not to litigate the same issue.7 However, if new
evidence emerged, or if a material error occurred in the first
trial, a litigant could bring a second proceeding in either the
same court or a different horizontally situated court.8 There is no
evidence of a vertical hierarchy of Mesopotamian courts, and
litigants lacked the means to appeal to a higher authority.9
Despite this absence of vertical appeal, some experts have come
to believe that at least some evidence suggests that “an appellate
process of some kind was practiced” in ancient Mesopotamia
based upon the availability to litigants, in certain circumstances,
of the second proceeding.10
B. Egypt
In its deeper past, Egypt’s judicial system resembled that of
Mesopotamia: horizontal courts and the availability of a new
trial if certain conditions—such as the discovery of new
evidence—were met.11 But by the Twenty-second Dynasty
(945–715 B.C.E.), Egypt employed an appellate system12 that
included a right of appeal in both civil and minor criminal
cases.13 Yet this appeal was not to a higher court of trained
judges, but to the mystical jurisprudence of an oracle.14
Litigants likely approached the oracle with an even greater
degree of solemnity and procedural formality than they would
38435-aap_17-1 Sheet No. 11 Side A
11/10/2016 09:41:10

7. RUSS VERSTEEG, EARLY MESOPOTAMIAN LAW 58 (2000) (indicating that this
“document of no (further) contest” showed “that the case was essentially res judicata”).
8. Id. (noting that “[i]n many cases . . . parties were not permitted any opportunity to a
higher authority” (footnote omitted)).
9. Id.
10. Ronald Veenker & J. Cale Johnson, The Appellate Process in a Legal Record {di
til-la} from Ur III Umma, 36 ALTORIENTAL. FORSCH. 349, 349 (2009) (discussing an
inscription on a tablet in which “an initial legal ruling adjudicated some aspects of the slave
sale in question, but other aspects such as the purchase price were appealled [sic] to the
court of the provincial governor,” while also noting that scholars hesitate to “accept the
existence of any formal process of appeal” or “a hierarchically organized system of
appellate courts” in ancient Mesopotamia).
11. Aristide Theodorides, The Concept of Law in Ancient Egypt, in THE LEGACY OF
EGYPT 291, 310 (J.R. Harris ed., 1971).
12. RUSS VERSTEEG, LAW IN ANCIENT EGYPT 89 (2002).
13. Id.
14. Id. The oracle was not only an intermediate appellate forum, it also had original
jurisdiction over real-property disputes, and was a frequent forum for identification of
thieves. Id. at 59–60.
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have brought to a court of justice; indeed, the ruling of the
oracle was perceived as a literal epiphany.15 Litigants could
petition for trial by oracle in either a written document or orally,
and evidence suggests that the petitions were carefully and
thoughtfully composed.16
The oracle as appellate decisionmaker was in its physical
manifestation a statue of a deity (sometimes but not always a
deceased and deified pharaoh) carried on a litter by several
priests who interpreted the will of the god by moving the litter
forward or backward in response to questions. Backward
movement indicated “no,” and historians speculate that forward
meant “yes.”17 Ancient sources also state that the deity “spoke,”
likely when directional movement could not adequately render a
judgment.18 Logic suggests that the god’s speech was uttered by
the priests, who briefly became de facto appellate justices before
returning to their priestly duties.
Despite the evidence supporting a role for the oracle in the
legal system, it bears noting that we have relatively little
confirmation of the oracle’s status as an intermediate appellate
forum. That conclusion is contingent on the accuracy of the
theory of some Egyptologists that a final appeal could, under
certain circumstances, be made to the reigning pharaoh
himself.19 In other situations, the decision of the oracle was
final.
C. Athens

11/10/2016 09:41:10

15. Id. at 58–59 (indicating that the oracle was believed to be the manifestation of a
deity, and its ruling a revelation of the deity’s will).
16. Id. at 58.
17. Id. at 59.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 88.
20. MICHAEL GAGARIN, EARLY GREEK LAW 73 (1989).
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Aristotle credits Solon, the sixth century B.C.E. Athenian
politician and poet, with giving the power of appeal to the
popular law courts.20 Although there are varying interpretations
among classicists as to the precise scope of the appellate system
created by Solon, the most probable construction—indeed, the
one supported by Plutarch’s writings—maintains that a litigant
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dissatisfied with the judgment of a magistrate could appeal to
the Eliaia, which was the assembly of Athenian citizens
convened for judicial purposes (a “jury,” in the modern sense).21
The Eliaia heard the case de novo and had the power to affirm
the magistrate’s judgment or reverse it and render a new
judgment.22 The Athenian appeal was limited to correction of
the magistrate’s judgment; the jury was the authoritative
pinnacle of Athenian jurisprudence and its judgments could not
be appealed. But by the fifth century B.C.E., magistrates no
longer rendered judgments, and legal disputes originated in the
Eliaia.23
D. Rome
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21. DOUGLAS M. MACDOWELL, THE LAW IN CLASSICAL ATHENS 30–33 (1978); RUSS
VERSTEEG, LAW IN THE ANCIENT WORLD 214–15 (2002).
22. See MACDOWELL, supra note 21, at 30.
23. VERSTEEG, supra note 21, at 214.
24. H.F. JOLOWICZ & BARRY NICHOLAS, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
OF ROMAN LAW 400, 400 n.8 (3d ed. 1972). But some appellate rights antedated the
imperial hierarchy of courts, such as the right of a Roman citizen to appeal a death sentence
rendered by a magistrate. See PAUL DU PLESSIS, BORKOWSKI’S TEXTBOOK ON ROMAN
LAW 5, 79–82 (4th ed. 2010) (noting that the appeal was “to the people,” and discussing
system of cognitio, or “investigation,” which included appeal).
25. See JOLOWICZ & NICHOLAS, supra note 24, at 444.
26. Id. at 400. Under certain circumstances, the emperor himself occasionally heard
appeals as an appellate court of final resort. See DU PLESSIS, supra note 24, at 81 (noting
that emperors’ jurisdiction became more “clearly delineated” over time).
27. DU PLESSIS, supra note 24, at 81.
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Classicists trisect Roman history into the monarchy, the
republic, and the empire. Not until the empire—with
implementation of a new legal procedure during the reign of the
emperor Augustus—did the Roman legal system adopt a
hierarchy of courts and an accompanying appellate system.24
Under that Roman appellate procedure, new evidence could be
presented in what essentially was a rehearing before a superior
court.25 Roman litigants were required to present oral or written
notices of appeal to the courts whose judgment they sought to
appeal.26 By the time Constantinople had become the center of
the empire, appellate volume had grown so great that the
emperor Justinian decreed that a judgment could not be appealed
more than twice.27
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II. ANCIENT APPELLATE LEGACY
A. The Appeal in America
1. In the Beginning
Contrary to popular belief, the United States did not
seamlessly inherit its appellate system from England. In fact,
English common law did not incorporate a formal appellate
system until the nineteenth century.28 The institution and vitality
of the appellate process in the American colonies may have been
a direct result of the preexisting corporate structure of the New
England trading companies, whose internal regulations featured
a vertical appellate system of remedy.29 This culture of
appeal30—itself impacted by European civil law, a form of
which was practiced in England’s ecclesiastical courts31—may
have in some geographic areas moved into the public sphere
during the transition from company-administered land grants to
colonies.32
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28. GREGORY DURSTON, CRIME AND JUSTICE IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 1500–
1750, at 627–28 (2004) (noting that “[h]istorically, common law lacked a mechanism
allowing an already adjudicated case to be appealed to a higher tribunal” and that
England’s “specialist Criminal Court of Appeal was only established in 1908,” and also
pointing out that it remains “very difficult to go beyond a jury decision” in England today).
29. Mary Sarah Bilder, The Origin of the Appeal in America, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 913,
944–50 (1997).
30. The term “culture of appeal” suggests that “the specialized technical usage of the
word [appeal] in legal spheres was inseparable from its more colloquial usage in the
political sphere and that the term, ‘the appeal,’ also referred to a set of broader meanings
and practices” during the early colonial period. Id. at 922.
31. Id. at 923. This culture of appeal traces back to imperial Roman legal procedure.
Id.; see also JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW
TRADITION 147 (2007) (noting that, while the origins of modern European civil law lie in
ancient Rome, a variety of German, French, and pan-European influences have impacted
its formation over the centuries). In keeping with the tradition of continental civil law,
English ecclesiastical courts possessed an advanced vertical appellate system long before
one appeared in English common law. R.B. OUTHWAITE, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE
ENGLISH ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS, 1500–1860 at 4 (2006) (noting that in the
ecclesiastical courts, “[a]ppeals generally lay from lower to higher courts”).
32. Bilder, supra note 29, at 944–50 (discussing colonial Massachusetts and Rhode
Island).
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Some American colonists possessed a right of appeal to the
Privy Council in London by the late seventeenth century.33 And
some of our oldest state supreme courts trace their histories back
to colonial times.34
2. Under the Constitution
The Constitution establishes the Supreme Court and grants
Congress the power to create inferior courts, thus contemplating
a judicial hierarchy,35 which Congress established in 1891 by
creating intermediate appellate courts.36 Their successors,
today’s federal courts of appeals, review questions of law de
novo and review findings of fact for substantial evidence in jury
trials and for clear error in bench trials.37
The Supreme Court exercises discretionary review.38 But a
civil litigant dissatisfied with the ruling of a federal district court
may either move for a new trial or move to vacate the judgment
based upon newly discovered evidence, and a criminal
defendant is given a similar opportunity.39 And of course a first
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33. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 16 (2005) (referring to
the Massachusetts Charter of 1691).
34. See, e.g., The Supreme Court of Virginia, VA. JUDICIAL SYS. (Sept. 2010), http://
www.courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/scvinfoinfo.pdf.; Supreme Court of Pennsylvania—
Overview, UNIFIED JUDICIAL SYS. OF PA. (2016), http://www.pacourts.us/learn?q=supreme;
About the Supreme Judicial Court, MASS. CT. SYS. (2016), http://www.mass.gov/courts/sjc
/supreme-judicial-court.html.
35. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (providing that “[t]he judicial power of the United States,
shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish”); U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 9 (empowering Congress to
“constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court”).
36. See, e.g., Andrew T. Solomon, The Texas Supreme Court’s Petition System: A
System in Need of Reexamination, 53 S. TEX. L. REV. 695, 696 n.2 (2012) (referring to
Evarts Act).
37. E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (providing that “the reviewing court must give due
regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility”); see Chen v.
Mukasey, 510 F.3d 797, 801–02 (8th Cir. 2007) (discussing differences between treatment
of administrative-law judge’s findings and findings by jury); Southex Exhibitions, Inc. v.
R.I. Builders Ass’n, Inc., 279 F.3d 94, 98 (1st Cir. 2002) (noting that “pure legal issues,
such as statutory interpretations, are reviewed de novo,” and that factual findings are
reviewed “only for clear error”). These standards of review trace to “the good old rule, that
on questions of fact, it is the province of the jury, on questions of law, it is the province of
the court to decide.” Ga. v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1, 4 (1794).
38. See, e.g., Solomon, supra note 36, at 696 n.2 (discussing discretionary review).
39. FED. R. CIV. P. 59 (“New Trial; Altering or Amending a Judgment”); FED. R. CIV.
P. 60 (“Relief From a Judgment or Order”); FED. R. CRIM. P. 33 (“New Trial”).
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appeal to the relevant federal court of appeals is a matter of
right.40
The Constitution does not mandate that states provide
appellate review.41 While not compelled to implement appellate
systems, every state has done so, and nearly every state offers
access to its appellate system by right.42
B. Our Ancient Appellate Inheritance

11/10/2016 09:41:10

40. See supra notes 2 & 3.
41. E.g., Griffin v. Ill., 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956).
42. Dalton, supra note 1, at 62 n.2 (noting that only Virginia and West Virginia do not
provide a right of appeal, but describing access to appellate courts available in those
states).
43. See, e.g., Solomon, supra note 36, at 695–96; Peter D. Marshall, A Comparative
Analysis Of The Right To Appeal, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1, 2–3 (2011) (pointing
out that primary purpose of appeal is correction of error); contra Dalton, supra note 1
(indicating that Virginia and West Virginia are exceptions).
44. See, e.g., GAGARIN, supra note 20, at 126–29 (advancing majority view); but see
generally RAYMOND WESTBROOK, EX ORIENTE LEX: NEAR EASTERN INFLUENCES ON
ANCIENT GREEK & ROMAN LAW (Deborah Lyons & Kurt Raaflaub eds., 2015) (advancing
minority view).
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The organizing principle behind every appellate system in
the United States is a vertical establishment of courts, with
higher courts possessing express power to correct the errors of
lower courts, and litigants in most states possessing a right to
appeal.43 Interestingly, there is a chronological trend toward this
modern appellate structure among the ancients, with a
progression from new trials in horizontally situated
Mesopotamian courts to vertical appeals in Rome. But this
progression probably did not involve the intercultural
transmission of early notions of appellate law from Near Eastern
to European civilizations: The majority of academics agree that
the creation of Greek and Roman law was endogenous to
Europe; only a minority point to Near Eastern influence.44 The
historical contribution and continuity of Rome’s appellate
system, alone, are the ancient characteristics most readily
verifiable in the modern appellate law of the United States.
Three components of ancient appellate law, millennia later,
are fundamental to our state and federal appellate systems: the
new trial, the right to appeal, and the vertical hierarchy of
appellate courts. Appellate systems of the ancient world appear
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45. See, e.g., VERSTEEG, supra note 7, at 58 (Mesopotamia); Theodorides, supra note
11, at 310 (Egypt).
46. FED. R. CIV. P. 59 (addressing new trial); FED. R. CRIM. P. 33 (same).
47. A timely motion for new trial extends the deadline for filing a notice of appeal.
FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(v).
48. See, e.g., VERSTEEG, supra note 12, at 89; VERSTEEG, supra note 21, at 214.
49. JOLOWICZ & NICHOLAS, supra note 24, at 400.
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to have originated as an equitable response to the post-trial
discovery of new evidence and the occurrence of error in the
application of law or in the findings of fact. These ancient
appellate systems first implemented horizontal new trials to
account for new evidence or error, and this implementation later
transitioned to a more sophisticated system of vertical appeal.
Thus, the ancients could obtain new trials if new evidence
emerged or if the original court materially erred;45 these
precedents endure.46 Indeed, a motion for new trial still precedes
and complements vertical appeal, a noteworthy procedural
integration of this ancient inheritance into a modern system.47
Origin of the right of appeal lies in the ancient world.48
Much as in the modern era, ancient litigants generally had a
right to intermediate appeal, but further appeal was
discretionary. Of course, the discretion of final appeal in the
ancient world ultimately resided with pharaoh or emperor, not a
federal or state court of last resort.
Among the ancient legal systems, Rome’s appellate system
most resembles our own. This resemblance not only is
evidenced in vertical appellate hierarchy and the staffing of
appellate courts with judges rather than jurors or priests, but also
in functional procedure such as the Roman notice of appeal.49
But the Athenian appellate system also cannot be overlooked;
vertical appeal to an appellate assembly of jurors satisfies the
modern definition of appeal, and may have been an intellectual
antecedent for Rome’s more developed system of vertical
appeals.
Sources available to reconstruct ancient appellate law are
scant, short, and fittingly delphic. Notwithstanding their
evidentiary shortcomings, they offer sufficient substance to
support an analysis that goes beyond the frequently encountered
generalization that appellate law originated in the ancient world.
Even with our limited access to the laws and legal records of the
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world’s oldest civilizations, we can trace the origins of appellate
law and practice. Their antiquity and continuing development
suggest in humanity an immemorial awareness of the fallibility
of human judgment, a yearning for the infallible judgment of
divinity, and—lacking this divine judgment—the desire to
implement a procedure to remedy our human error.
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